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United States Discovery and Foreign Blocking 
Statutes 
Vivian Grosswald Curran 
It is a privilege to contribute to this Issue of the Louisiana Law Review 
dedicated to the career of my dear friend and admired colleague, Alain 
Levasseur. His contributions to mutual common law and civil law 
understanding are without parallel. The following Essay is intended as a 
“translation” between the two legal cultures that Alain Levasseur has 
illuminated for us throughout his professional life.  
The reality between discovery in the United States and the foreign 
blocking statutes that impede discovery in numerous civil law countries 
has been an uncomfortable mixture of resistance, insistence, and conflict 
for the nations involved. American courts grapple with the challenge of 
understanding why they should adhere to strictures that seem to 
compromise the fundamental rights of American plaintiffs, while French 
and German lawyers and judges struggle with the challenges that United 
States discovery rules pose to equally fundamental values in their legal 
systems. This Essay seeks to address these issues. 
In an era of transnationalized commerce, discovery in the United 
States finds itself pitted against the blocking statutes that foreign nations 
enacted to impede. Discovery in the United States has reached the status 
of a quasi-constitutional—if not an outright constitutional—right.1 Judges 
are highly reluctant to allow foreign defendants to diminish an American 
plaintiff’s ability to discover evidence and frequently are also suspicious 
that the blocking statute, offered as the reason for a foreign national’s 
motion to withhold evidence, may be no more than a façade designed to 
interfere with the American court’s jurisdiction. In Adidas (Canada) Ltd. 
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 1. See Imre Stephen Szalai, A Constitutional Right to Discovery? Creating 
and Reinforcing Due Process Norms Through the Procedural Laboratory of 
Arbitration, 15 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 337, 374–75 (2015); Ganesh Bala, Note, 
Discovery—First and Fifth Amendment Privileges—District Court Should 
Balance Threatened Harm to Constitutional Rights Against Requesting Party’s 
Need for Relevant Information in Deciding Whether to Order Civil Discovery of 
Information Privileged Under the First and Fifth Amendments, 27 VILL. L. REV. 
198, 200 (1981). 
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v. S/S Seatrain Bennington,2 the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York quoted a report made to France’s National Assembly during the 
process of debates that were a precursor to the blocking statute’s 
enactment. The report highlighted the possibility that the law would not in 
fact pose a risk to French nationals of incurring the statute’s ostensible 
penalties, but would merely be a way for French defendants to evade 
United States discovery:  
A report to the French National Assembly recommended the law’s 
adoption on the ground that it would offer French nationals “a 
legal excuse for refusing to supply the information and documents 
demanded of them [and] a judicial weapon which will at least make 
it possible for them to gain time. The conflict thus created will block 
matters for a time and will make it possible to raise the conflict to a 
governmental level.” With respect to the potential penalties, the 
report noted that “it is necessary not to misunderstand the actual 
scope of these penalties . . . [because] . . . these penalties are applied 
only on the improbable assumption that the companies would refuse 
to make use of the protective provisions offered to them. In all other 
cases, these potential fines will assure foreign judges of the judicial 
basis for the legal excuse which companies will not fail to make use 
of.”3  
France and Germany enacted blocking legislation in response to what 
those countries considered the excessive and abusive intrusion of American 
litigants into the affairs of their companies, often by competitors.4 Further, 
                                                                                                             
 2. Nos. 80 Civ. 1911 (PNL), 82 Civ. 0375 (PNL), 1984 WL 423 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 30, 1984). 
 3. Id. at *3 n.4 (quoting Report No. 1814, Nat’l Assembly Comm. on Prod. 
& Exchs., 1979–1980, 2d Sess., at 61, 63–64 (June 19, 1980) (Fr.)).  
 4. See Kami Haeri, Laissez la loi de blocage tranquille!, GAZETTE DU 
PALAIS, Feb. 29, 2012, at 7; Noëlle Lenoir, Le droit de la preuve à l’heure de 
l’extraterritorialité, REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF [R.F.D.A.], 
May–June 2014, at 487; see generally GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 972 (5th ed. 2011) 
(“[M]ost foreign blocking statutes . . . were precipitated by unilateral extraterritorial 
discovery efforts.”). Born and Rutledge also point out that this is not universally the 
case, as with older blocking statutes, such as the Swiss law of 1934, which was 
enacted in response to Nazi German examinations of Swiss banking matters. Id. 
On the impact of U.S. antitrust laws, see Note, Reassessment of International 
Application of Antitrust Laws: Blocking Statutes, Balancing Tests, and Treble 
Damages, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 197, 197; Bate C. Toms 
III, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States 
Antitrust Laws, 15 INT’L LAW. 585, 590 (1981). 
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in continental Europe, the American-style pretrial evidence acquisition is 
not permissible within domestic practice.5 In both France and Germany, a 
deeply entrenched principle of law directly derived from Roman law 
shields parties from an obligation to assist their opponent in litigation.6 
This principle of law, however, exists in an overarching legal system in 
which the legal representatives are committed to assisting in a search for 
the truth that is less partisan than the American equivalent of zealous 
advocacy. The judge, rather than the parties, conducts that search for the 
truth.7  
In France and Germany, documents and other information in the 
possession of an adversary can be requested only through the judge and 
then only with specificity.8 Thus, in advance of the request to the judge for 
discovery from the other party, an adversary would need to know what 
information the other party possesses and be able to explain to the judge 
how that information is relevant to the requesting party’s case. Normally, 
only the judge, rather than the parties, can request information in the form 
of documents or other pertinent facts from each party and direct the course 
of information gathering.9 Because American litigants are not used to 
seeking judicial approval for each document sought and each witness 
questioned, many of those litigants have a tendency to arrange for 
American-style discovery in France and Germany without the knowledge 
of French or German legal authorities. 
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters of 197010 was negotiated to facilitate foreign 
discovery, create a systematic method that would shorten what could be 
unpredictable time lengths for obtaining evidence abroad, and develop a 
system that no state would consider an intrusion on its national 
                                                                                                             
 5. See, e.g., UGO A. MATTEI ET AL., SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW 762 
(7th ed. 2009) (“In most civil-law countries, discovery is almost non-existent.”). 
 6. For Germany, see David B. Adler, Schritt in Richtung Beilegung des deutsch-
amerikanischen Justizkonflikts? – Zur geplanten Einschränkung des Totalvorbehalts 
gegenüber exterritorialer discovery-Anfragen US-amerikanischer Gerichte, IPRax, 
July–Aug. 2015, at 364, 365 (“[N]iemand verpflichtet ist, dem Gegner die Waffen für 
einen Prozess in die Hand zu legen . . . .”). For France, see JEAN HILAIRE, ADAGES ET 
MAXIMES DU DROIT FRANÇAIS 157 (2d ed. 2015) (“Nul n’est tenu de produire contre 
lui-même.”). The phrase from Roman law is Nemo contra se edere tenetur. Id. 
 7. PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 10–11 (2004). 
 8. For France, see James Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 
34 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 460–61, 466 (1986). For Germany, see OSCAR G. CHASE 
ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 223 (2007). 
 9. See supra note 8. 
 10. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241. 
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sovereignty.11 In the landmark United States Supreme Court case of 
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Iowa,12 however, the Court held that domestic 
discovery rules from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of the 
Hague Convention may be applied when appropriate on a case-by-case 
basis.13 In the almost three decades that have followed, United States 
courts have been inclined to favor domestic rules over the Hague 
Convention.14 
When documents are located outside of the United States, this means 
by definition that the rules of civil procedure under which discovery is 
conducted have an extraterritorial effect. This situation is problematic to 
the extent that United States rules of procedure contravene foreign laws in 
the nation in which the discovery is to occur. To the United States judge 
and plaintiff, the procedure may not seem extraterritorial inasmuch as 
discovery abroad merely subjects a litigant, who is a party to a United 
States action and over whom the United States court has jurisdiction, to 
discovery of documents that the party has chosen to keep abroad. On the 
other hand, to the nation whose legal system has fundamental problems 
with the nature of United States discovery in terms of privacy and other 
concerns discussed herein, United States discovery seems both 
extraterritorial and a breach of its national sovereignty.15 Similarly, when 
foreign nations enact blocking statutes that forbid information from being 
divulged in United States pretrial discovery, the blocking laws have an 
extraterritorial effect to the extent that they will impact legal rights and 
options of United States litigants in actions brought in a United States 
court and intrude on the jurisdiction of those courts.16  
United States courts generally have not been deferential to blocking 
statutes that, as in the case of France, may make acceding to American 
discovery a criminal violation.17 Indeed, some United States courts have 
                                                                                                             
 11. Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on Its 
Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1996, at 77, 78. 
 12. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 13. Id. at 534–38. 
 14. Born, supra note 11, at 86. 
 15. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 971–72 (citing relevant sources). 
 16. The French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) has specifically held that 
the mere fact of being extraterritorial in effect does not make a French law 
unconstitutional. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision 
No. 81-132DC, Jan. 16, 1982 (Fr.). 
 17. Loi 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980 relative à la communication de documents 
et renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial ou technique à des personnes 
physiques ou morales étrangères [Law 80-538 of 16 July 1980 on the Disclosure 
of Documents and Information of an Economic, Commercial or Technical Nature 
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been highly dismissive of these blocking statutes, describing them as a 
ploy to evade legitimate discovery through sham punishments that need 
never be applied.18  
In France, the blocking statute had indeed never actually been applied 
until 2007, when the French Supreme Court, the Cour de cassation, affirmed 
a lower court application.19 In the years following, however, its application 
has not seemed to alter the tendency of United States courts to overlook the 
existence of the statute, as the French blocking statute was not met with 
greater deference after 2007 than before. Meanwhile, the ability of 
American courts to allow discovery that affects other nations has only 
expanded.  
In particular, under Section 1782 of the United States Code,20 litigants 
in foreign suits in foreign nations may apply to an American court for 
assistance in evidence gathering.21 While that legal provision is not of 
recent vintage, the United States Supreme Court in Intel v. AMD22 held 
that Section 1782 would be available to foreign litigants even if the 
information sought was not discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction in 
which the action had been brought and was proceeding.23 One may well 
surmise that, although Congress intended Section 1782 to provide the 
assistance of the American courts to foreign nations and thus to be a 
positive contribution to their courts, the nations involved may perceive the 
statute as a reinforced intrusion into the national sovereignty of foreign 
                                                                                                             
to Foreign Individuals or Legal Entities], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July 17, 1980, at 1700. 
 18. See Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 374–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“As 
held by numerous courts, the French Blocking Statute does not subject defendants 
to a realistic risk of prosecution, and cannot be construed as a law intended to 
universally govern the conduct of litigation within the jurisdiction of a United 
States court. Thus, applying Aerospatiale and Minpeco, other courts have 
uniformly declined to give effect to the French Blocking Statute, or to hold that 
the existence of the statute requires that discovery of French defendants take place 
under the Hague Convention.”). 
 19. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 
12, 2007, Bull. Crim., No. 07-83228 (Fr.).  
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2014). 
 21. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 263. 
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states.24 In Kulzer v. Biomet,25 for instance, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a German company, Hereus—which had sued the 
defendant company in Germany—was entitled to American-style discovery 
of documents located in the United States, even though obtaining those 
documents through the German court system would have been impossible 
because such discovery of an open nature is not allowed there.26 Despite 
acknowledging the unavailability of such discovery in Germany, the 
forum jurisdiction, the United States appellate court opined that the 
plaintiff had not been trying to “circumvent German law” through its broad 
discovery requests to the American court.27 
Germany, like France, opted out of its duty to comply with the Hague 
Convention letters of request under the Convention’s Article 23 opt-out 
provision with regard to requests “issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-
trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries.”28 
Germany also has blocking legislation, but is now amending the legislation 
to end what is known as the deutsch-amerikanischer29 Justizkonflikt or 
conflict between the two countries on the matter of evidence gathering.30 
Whereas the current law forbids the discovery of any documents located 
in Germany, under the pending legislation, some American document 
                                                                                                             
 24.  See Pauline Dubarry et al., L’Obtention des preuves en France et à 
l’étranger, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, July 14, 2014, at 1418, 1419 (referring to 
Section 1782 as a “destabilizing” mechanism, allowing a private party to seek an 
advantage of surprise in what strikes them as an ex parte procedure that can result 
in a “traumatic” effect on its adversary, despite the adversary’s having an 
opportunity to voice its opposition to the judge. The authors characterize Section 
1782 as affording the opportunity to manoeuver around the Hague Convention’s 
letters rogatory and note that French law has always taken the position that every 
signatory State to the Hague Convention is obliged to follow its procedures in lieu 
of national procedures on evidence gathering.). 
 25. 633 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 26. Id. at 595. 
 27. Id. at 597. 
 28. 847 U.N.T.S. at 245. Most contracting states have opted out of article 23, 
thus avoiding an obligation to comply with United States pre-trial discovery. In 
addition to article 23, article 33 offers an opt-out of deposition mechanisms. It 
should be noted that the traditional civil law legal system does not permit a lawyer 
to have any direct contact with an opposing party or witness. Only judges may 
conduct the equivalent of depositions. In France in particular, in a civil (non-
criminal) case, generally every communication would be in writing. See, e.g., 
Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes 
Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM J. COMP. L. 363, 377 (2008). 
 29. “German-American.” 
 30. On the Justizkonflikt, see Anke Meier, U.S. Discovery: The German 
Perspective, DAJV NEWSL., Nov. 1, 2012, at 9–11. 
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discovery, in principle, will be allowed to take place in Germany.31 
Substantively, however, the amended legislation will go no further than 
allowing what the Hague Convention prescribes.32 According to Dr. Adler, 
the new law is intended to encourage American judges to modify their 
inclination to use United States domestic laws of civil procedure on 
discovery in lieu of the Hague Convention.33 However, given that a strong 
body of case law has been developed over decades in the United States—
a common law system operating under stare decisis—the chances of this 
modification reaching its desired effect seem doubtful. 
Of course, as of December 1, 2015, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as they relate to discovery also underwent amendment.34 
Although the thrust of the amendments has been to curtail “fishing 
expeditions” or the excessive scope of discovery, the amendments do not 
impinge on the basic nature of discovery in the United States. 35 American 
discovery remains vast and oriented to allowing parties to conduct their 
own search for information without specific knowledge of the nature of an 
adversary’s information and with a concomitant obligation to produce the 
same to the adversary—the very aspects that cannot be adapted to 
continental European systems of law.  
An eminent French lawyer and former cabinet minister has suggested 
that discovery in transnational litigation as it has developed in the United 
States since Aérospatiale may constitute a violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.36 She argues that such discovery denies a 
foreign party a fair trial (procès équitable) inasmuch as failure to comply 
with discovery may deprive a foreign corporation of its own right to 
present evidence under the Federal Rules,37 a violation of one of the most 
fundamental rights of every French—and other continental European and 
                                                                                                             
 31. See Adler, supra note 6, at 365. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 364.  
 34. Press Release, Dist. of N.D., U.S. Dist. Court, on Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure effective Dec. 1, 2015, http://www.ndd.uscourts.gov 
/announce/FRCP_Update_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX4F-P3K9] (last visited Jan. 
25, 2016). 
 35. The principal goal is to ensure that the scope of discovery becomes 
“proportional to the needs of the case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 36. Lenoir, supra note 4, at 499.  
 37. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, 45; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442(2)(c) (1986) (providing that a 
United States court or agency may make findings of fact adverse to a party even 
if that party has made a good faith effort to comply with the foreign jurisdiction’s 
blocking statute). 
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every E.U. Member State—litigant’s rights.38 This right is known to the 
French as the right to present opposing evidence or, literally, as the 
principle or benefit of the contradictory (evidence): le principe ou le 
bénéfice du contradictoire.39  
Clearly, the Hague Convention on Evidence has not solved the 
problem of foreign evidence gathering. No doubt one can describe the 
problem as the insistence of United States courts to elude the treaty. The 
deeper problem is that discovery is an entrenched, fundamental right of 
the American litigant.40 Further, from the start, the Hague Convention has 
included an opt-out provision, allowing foreign states to refuse such 
discovery.41 Civil law nations and their courts have a duty to protect their 
citizens from the reach of American discovery as much as their United 
States counterparts have a duty to exert discovery. In 1994, Gary Born 
suggested as a reform model that, in exchange for a binding commitment 
that United States courts apply the Hague Convention, foreign states 
would abandon Article 23 opt-outs under the Convention and execute 
American letters of request for discovery delivered pursuant to the 
Convention where the information sought was “materially relevant” to the 
litigation.42 
Noëlle Lenoir suggests that, for France, the solution is to persuade 
both American judges and French litigants that the French blocking statute 
must be taken seriously.43 She would like to see the statute applied much 
more frequently so that United States judges understand that the statute 
imposes a legal obligation to abide by the statute under pain of criminal 
sanction to French nationals, and thus is far from the sham threat to French 
citizens that United States judges often perceive it to be.44 She also would 
like the fines attached to the blocking statute to be dramatically higher for 
French litigants who violate the law by complying with American 
discovery requests.45 She reasons that the current fines do not represent a 
deterrent for multinational corporate defendants even if judges were to 
                                                                                                             
 38. See Lenoir, supra note 4, at 487, 499. 
 39. See Principe de le contradiction et droits de la défense, COUR DE CASSATION, 
https://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_26/rapport_annuel_36/rapport_2012_4 
571/livre_3_etude_preuve_4578/partie_4_administration_preuve_4589/principes_g 
ouvernant_4591/principe_contradiction_26240.html [https://perma.cc/KZ43-KHCX] 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016). 
 40. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 41. See supra note 10. 
 42. Born, supra note 11, at 77–78.  
 43. Lenoir, supra note 4, at 493, 497. 
 44. Id. at 496. 
 45. Id. at 500. 
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apply the blocking statute against French nationals with more zeal than 
they do today.46  
As law transnationalizes in the sense of ever-increased encounters 
across the globe’s judicial fora, some harmonization will need to be 
developed so that values from civil law and common law legal orders can 
coexist. One option that has flourished is the non-state solution of 
international arbitration, which has taken precedence over national courts 
for the resolution of international disputes in private law. This institution 
has so far proven flexible. International arbitration tribunals, often 
composed of arbitrators from both common law and civil law states, may 
allow a limited amount of discovery, enough maybe to permit a common 
law American litigant adequate discovery for comfort. One might perhaps 
phrase the situation more aptly in the converse: the application of rules of 
general international arbitration may put litigants from common law and 
civil law states in a condition of mutual discomfort, but a discomfort each 
side seems able to accept.  
All major international arbitration institutions permit discovery. 
Arbitrators vary in how much they will permit, and the International Bar 
Association rules refer only to selected aspects of American-style 
discovery.47 For careful lawyers, however, the matter of discovery in any 
future arbitration between contracting parties from different legal systems 
can be regulated completely through the contract’s arbitration clause if the 
lawyers on both sides can reach a mutually satisfactory agreement about 
the amount and nature of the discovery they will be able to conduct in case 
of a future dispute.  
For the moment, the United States and other civil law nations lumber 
forward in their task of better “translating” each other’s legal systems and 
cultures to increase understanding and to enhance international 
harmonization; perhaps that is the most for which one can ask. 
  
                                                                                                             
 46. Id.  
 47. 1999 INT’L BAR ASS’N WORKING PARTY & 2010 INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES OF 
EVIDENCE REVIEW SUBCOMM., COMMENTARY ON THE REVISED TEXT OF THE 2010 
IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 7 (2010), 
available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=DD2409 
32-0E08-40D4-9866-309A635487C0 [https://perma.cc/TS3L-EFLB]. 
